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Introduction 
The focus of my interest for a practicuum was social 
work methodology. When I first talked with Dr. Breedlove 
concerning my practicuum we agreed that I should do library 
research regarding social work as a problem oriented, as 
opposed to a procedure oriented, practice. My subsequent 
library work focused upon the question most fundamental to 
effective social work practice: How is the problem defined? 
What was the value position underlying the definition? 
Numerous practice models exist within the profession 
of social work. No one can prove that one 1s more effective 
than another. If one model can demonstrate that it has a 
statistically higher success rate it is still unable to link 
cause with effect: it cannot show what it was in treatment 
that made the outcome better. One of the problems is that 
evaluative research has not proven to be an effective tool 
for the ~pplied social sciences •. How could the researcher" 
-evaluate when neither the problem nor the outcome have been 
minimally defined, much less operationallzed? Even more 
basic to evaluative research is the definition of the under­
lying value assumptions. How, for example, was the decision 
made that the client was "improved" as a result of therapy? 
Whose relativ,e definition of health/illness was utilized? 
2 
The position assumed in this paper 1s that whether 
a worker selects one practice model over another is 
basically a value quest10n. There are some unique and·dia­
metrically opposed value pOSitions assumed within the 
social sciences, and it is imperative that workers under­
stand what these positions are so that they know where they 
are going. This paper will focus upon the value pOSitions / 
underlying two social work models: the traditional or psy-
I 
chodynam1c and that of behavior modification. It is recog­
nized that there are areas in which those twa approaches do 
not seem far removed, e.g., with some neo-behaviorists 
and/or some ego psychologists. However, to the extent that 
the lines become very blurred, so does the clar1ty of posi­
tion or practice. Like many practitioners who claim to be 
nec1ectic," it becomes extremely difficult to find out 
where they are and what they do value at a given point in 
time. Why do social workers become so caught up in treat­
ment facts? Because they have npt clearly defined what they 
value and where those values lead them. 
In order to demonstrate that the profession of social 
work has moved from pos'ition to position, this paper will 
first sketch briefly the early history of social casework. 
Second, the paper will focus upon some of the baSic dangers 
involved in "borrowing" from the knowledge of other disci­
plines. Finally, two major practice models, the traditional 
.' . :, 
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model and the behavior modification model will be described 
both in terms of their nature and development and in terms 
of their conflictual value positions. Social workers need 
to be cautious not only to identify the values from which 
they are operatfng, but also to be certain that their posi­
tions are not too narrow or simplistic for the effective 
dealing with life. 
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A Brief History of Social Work Practice 
Grace Coyle once noted that, "Social work has always 
been dominated by two factors: the social climate in which 
1t moves and the state of the sciences on which it is 
dependent. III This being true some thirty years hence, it 
1s necessary to understand not only the social work litera­
ture, but the zeitgeist which has continued to alter the 
emphasis and direction of social work effort. 
Early in the twentieth century social work, influ­
enced both philosophically by pragmatism and soc1ally and 
politically by the Progressive era, was in what has been 
termed the sociolog1cal stage: a stage which centered upon 
the conviction that manls life experience was env1ron­
mentally determined. Pragmatism drew away from the Puritan 
belief that man's problems were d~e to moral inadequacy and 
toward the recognition that many of man's problems could be 
traced to his environmento "Reform the environment in the 
service of the individual was the battle cry. The method 
proposed was the use of the social sciences, especially 
sociology.,,2 Thus social workers directed their efforts at 
lGrace L. Coyle, "Social Work at the Turn of the 
Decade," Proceedings of the National Conference of Social 
Work (1940), p. 12. 
2Nathan Edward Cohen, Social Work in the American 
Tradition (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1958). 
p. 314. 
../ 
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mod1fioation of ~he milieu. Suoh intervention inoluded 
things like child plaoement, ne1ghborhood houses, separating 
indiv1duals within families, and changing jobs. 3 
This, then, was the sooial climate of the early nine­
teen hundreds, but the other faotor was of equal import: 
the state of the soiences. Newton was, and continues to be, 
the theoretical giant; and social work was opt1mistic that 
the key to prevention and cure would lie in such soientific 
laws and methods. 4 Not only were social workers in need of 
a scientific knowledge base for their profession, but there 
was also the omnipresent belief that science would oure all 
soc1al 1lls and lead to unlimited progress. Exemplary of 
this belief was the development of the Charity Organization 
Societies, in the 1870's, for the purpose of making charity, 
or almsgiving, scientific and efficient. 
In 1889 a paper entitled "Scientific Charity" by
Mrs. Glendower Evans (National Conference of Charities 
and Corrections Proceedings l889:24} likened the appli­
cation of SCience to charity to the use of a physician
in illness, ~rging that the same intelligence and 
scientific spirit which created power over the phYSie~l 
world be used to understand and modify social forces. 
3Gordon J. Aldridge, liThe Influence of Freud on 
Social Work," Mental Hygiene, Vol. 42, No.2 '(1958), pp.
284-288. 
4Carel Germain, "Casework & SCience: A Historical 
Enoounter," in Theories of Social Casework, ed. by Robert 
W. Roberts, Robert H. Nee (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1970), p. 8. 
5Ibid •
'­
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Ma£Y Richmond: Social Diagnosis 
It was with Mary Richmond's publication of Social 
r' i' 
I. Diagnosis in 1917 that the foundation was laid for a scien­
tific approach to casework. 6 Social diagnosis was comprised 
of the definition of the social situation and the perscon­
r ality of the client. This diagnosis, arrived at by a pro­! 
cess of collecting and evaluating information and drawingh 
I 
inferences, was conceived of as a procedure common to all 
casework. Miss Richmond, writing in the period described 
above as "sociological,1I stressed the situational aspects of 
," 
the case: the history gathering was emphasized with the 
belief that if enough facts were collected the problem's 
solution would be forthcoming. There were two key concepts 
to Miss Richmond's philosophy: that there were differences 
between and among individuals, and that man is a product of 
his social relationshlps.7 Social work's basic aim, from 
Mary Richmond's perspective was the development of person­
ality. Casework consisted "of those processes which develop 
6Charlotte Towle, "Social Casework,tr Social Work 
Yearbook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947) in 
Carel Germain, Ibid., p. 9. 
7Irma Stein (unpublished paper, New York School of, 
Social Work, in Cohen, ~. cit., pp. 131-132. 
7 
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personality through adjustment's consciously effected, indi­
vidual by individual, between men and their social environ­
ment. u8 
At the time when Miss Richmond was writing, social 
work was beginning to feel the impact of psychia.try. Albei t 
Freudian theory was not yet dominant, Richmond did lean 
heavily on the "social psychiatric" writings of Adol:ph Meyer 
of Johns Hopkins university.9 It is notable that in 1911 
Dr. Meyer read a paper on HCase Work in Social Service 
and Medical and Social Cooperation in Nervous and Mental Dis­
eases.'110 Also in some cities, 
• • • psychiatrists were members of case conferences, 
and contributed not only to the method of understanding 
clients, but also to the education of the professional
staff. The influence had been only rarely felt before 
the war; but after 1918 1t became essential for anyone 
practicing in the field of social casework to under­
stand the dynamic functions of the emotions. ll 
Influenced by psychiatry, social work was then con­
currently influenced by medicine. Mary Richmond, for 
example, not only quoted frequently from William Osler, the 
8Mary E. Richmond, What is Social Casework? (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 1922), p. 98. 
9Barbu Valer, review of trThe Commonsense Psychiatry
of Adolph Meyer," in American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
1950, p. 71j V. Meyer and Edward s. Chesser, Behavior ~nerapy 
in Clinical Psychiatry (New York: Science House, Inc., 
1970), p. 14; Frank J. Bruno, Trends in Social Work 1874-1956 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 187, 284. 
lOBruno, 2£. cit., p. 183. 
llIbid., p. 187. 
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famous Johns Hopkins surgeon, but two of her closest ad­
visors were prominent physicians. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that these many asso­
ciations contributed to her development of the medical 
or disease metaphor of social diagnosis and treatment. 
It was during the Baltimore years that she wrote, for 
example, of pauperism as Ita disease" and of the friendly 
visitor as a "social" physician or general practitioner 
of charity who is called upon to "heal" complex condi­
tions. 12 . 
This medical, or disease model, was one by which the 
individual's behavior was considered peculiar, abnormal or 
··diseased, because of some underlying cause j the analogy 
being made, of course, to medicine in which lesions, germs, 
viruses and other insults foreign to the normal working of 
the organisms lead to symptom production. 13 
Psychiatric influence was not as apparent 1n Social 
Diagnosis, which gave equal time to the "inner" ·and "outer" 
factors affecting personality development, as it was in 
12Muriel Pumphrey, "Mary Richmond and the Rise of 

Professional Social Work in Baltimore," DSW dissertation, 

Columbia University School of Social Work, Univer~ity Micro­

films Publication.#17,076, Ann Arbor, Michigan, in Germain, 

~o cit., pp. 12-13. 

l3Leonard P. Ullman and Leonard Krasner, Case Studies 
1n Behavior Modification (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win­
ston, 1965), p. 12; L. B. Thorpe and B. Katz, The Psychology 
of Abnormal Behavior (New York: Ronald, 1948), pp. 161-162,
166; N. A. Cameron, Personalit Develo ment an~ Psycho ath- , 
ology (Boston: Houghton Miff~in Company, 19 3 ,p. 52; 
A. P. Noyes and L. C. Kolb, Modern Clinical Psychiatry, 5th 

ed. (Philadelphia: Saunder, 1958), p. 96. 

1 
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other social work realms. Three outstanding attempts were 
made prior to the 1930's to establish a generic base for 
1 
I 
I 
1 
casework. The first was Mary Richmond's Social Diagnosis 
The second was the paper pre~ented by Mary Jarrett at the 
National Conference of Social Work in 1919 entitled, "The 
Psychiatric Thread Running Through All Social Case Work." 
The third was the emphasis in the 1929 Milford Conference 
Report which tended to limit casework to "the adjustment of 
the deviant individual to his environment. rr14 Thus sQcial 
casework which had been accused by Abraham Flexner in 1915 
of having no transmissible knowledge and skill of its own 
was embracing the new developments of psychiatry: a medical 
model, and with it, a study-diagnosis-treatment framework,.15 
Social Factors 
Many social factors were 
tion of the psychiatric model. 
seeking professional status were 
operating in favor of adop­
Workers in medical settings 
anxious to differentiate 
themselves from nurses and other staff; by identifying with 
the higher status profession of medicine, with the physi­
cian's body of knowledge and his method of diagnosis and 
14Cohen, ~. cit., p. 140. 
l5Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, Indus­
trial Society and Social Welfare (New York: The Free Press, 
1958), p. 177 • 
I ~" ,..., 
• • 
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16 
treatment, s;ocial wo:rk status was enhanced. During this 
same period 'mental hea~th settings were receiving the im­
pact of the ,mental hygiene movement. Clifford Beerls book, 
A Mind Tha t 'Found Itself, gave strong impetus to the already 
burgeoning lnterest in the indiVidual qua individual. 
With the opening of Smith College1s training school 
for psychiatric social workers, social work both responded 
to the need for trained workers to handle the emotional 
problems of 'returning World War I veterans and relatives, 
and it established precedent for a psychiatric training 
model. The following notice of opening appeared: 
On J~ly 8, 1918, Smith College and the Boston Psy­
chopathic Hospital, under the auspices of the National 
Committee of Mental Health, will open at Smith College 
a train~ng school for psychiatric social workers to 
assist fn the rehabilitation of soldiers·suffering from 
shell-shock and other nervous disorders. 17 
This announcement marked the culmination of the dream of 
Miss Mary Jarrett and Dr. Ernest Southard to establish "a 
profession School which would emphasize the importance of 
,,18social 	work in the practice of psychiatry • 
l6Roy Lubov, Professional Altruist, ch. 2 "From 
Friendly Visiting to Social Diagnosis," in Germain, op. cit., 
p. 	13. 
17Elizabeth L. Grover, "History and Philosophy of 
Social Welfare, 1918-1932" (unpublished paper,. New York 
School of Social Work, April 1956, in Cohen, ~. cit., pp. 
132-133. 
18Cohen, op. cit., p. 133. 
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During World War I, social workers were not only 
responding to the emotional needs of veterans, but to the 
increasing interest of psychiatry, psychology and biology 
in the psychological aspects of human behavior. Typical of 
this interest in the United States was the "home service 
divisions" of the American Red Cross. Because of tl:le war 
shortage~ of psychiatrists, social workers, supervised by 
psychiatrists, were given substantial responsibility in the 
treatment of psychoneurotic patients. 
Following World War I the nation turned within 
itself. It refused to accept the growing interdependence of 
the world and instead turned to isolationism. Concurrent 
with the end of the war was the demise of the Progressive 
·era, and the national concern for social reform. Social 
reform, for social workers, was both out of fashion, and 
often politically dangerous; therefore social work turned to 
working more intenSively with the individual and to sharpen­
ing its technical skil1. l9 
In summary, social work shifted, to use Porter Leels 
t·erms, from a preoccupation with ffcause" to a preoccupation 
with "function." It must be born in mind that this turn 
19E• Pumpian-M1ndlin, "The Position of Psychoanalysis 
in Relation to the Biological and Social Sciences," in Psy­
choanalysis as Science (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1952), pp. 133-134, in Cohen, ~. cit., pp. 317-319. 
12 

1nward was not unique to social work. The post war twenties 
brought a "cu1turewide interest in the unique inner world 
of individual experience. U20 Important is the fact that 
soc1a1 work practice reflected the spirit of the times. 
The Impact of Freud 
Sigmund Freud offered to social work a behavioral 
theory which accounted for all the data of human behavior, 
its development, and its pathological deviations. Albeit 
'Freud was formulating a specific, while general, theory 
he remained in contact with the concrete details of life so 
that his general set of postulates and assumptions had high 
applicability. 
Freud's theoretical relationship to the so-called 
medical model is straightforward. His first training was in 
medicine: physiology. The following account taken from 
Freud's major professor's lecture briefly describes his "edu­
cational orientation: 
. 
Physiology is the science of organisms as such. 
Organisms differ from dead material entities in action-­
machines in possessing the faculty of assimilation, but 
they are all phenomena of the physical world; systems
of atoms, moved by forces, according to the principle
of the conservation of energy discovered by Robert 
Mayer in 1842, neglicted for 20 years, and then popular­
ized by He1mho1tz. 2 
20Germain, op. cit., p. 16. 
21E. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 
(New York: Basic Books, 1953), pp. 41-45. I 
13 

Jones went on to say: 
It has often been assumed that Freud's psychological
theories date from his contact with Charcot or Breuer 
or even later. On the contrary, it can be shown that 
the principles on which he constructed his theories 
were those he had a~~uired as a medical student under 
Brucke's influence. 
Most important for social work practice was not 
Freud's metapsychology, but the inSights which he provided 
regarding the nature of man: Social influence in early life 
1s most important because the basic personality structure is 
laid down during the first six years of life. Man is moti­
vated by his instincts (life and death) and 1s continually 
engaged 1n work1ng w1th his 1nstinctual conflicts; there­
fore, all behavior is not rational because 1t is rooted 1n 
the 1rrational emotions. Much behavior is not conscious and 
is therefore not amenable to "direct ll influence. 
Therapy based upon Freudian insight adheres to the 
basic idea that motives dictate behavior. This means, for' 
one thing, that disordered behavior is the result of pecul­
iarities inside the individual. 23 Following the' medical 
22Ibid .; Gr.egory Zilboorg and George W. Henry, A 
Hl'story oTMedical Psychology (New York: W. W. Norton-and 
Co., 1941), 1n Herbert Bisno, The Philosophy of Social Work, 1 
(Wash1ngton, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1952), p. 87. . 
23Gordon J. Aldridge, "The Influence of Freud on 
Social Work," Mental Hygiene, Vol. 42, No.2 (1958), pp.
284-288. 
I 
I 
J. 
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model, the therapist must seek out the inne~ states that 
underl1e the surface d1ff1culties and by bringing them to 
light, loosen the bond between them and the disordered be­
havior they produce; the therapist attempts to lead the 
patient to some "insight" regarding the relationship between 
his motivations and his behavior. 24 Insight means under­
standing: if the client understands the basis of his be­
havior, then that behavior is more meaningful. The client, 
gaining insight, is not only freed from disabling symptoms, 
but his life is made more meaningful. Perry London de­
scribed the technic of "insight therapy" as, 
• • • essentially a systematization of the Socratic 
teaching method, in which a person's ••• 1deas, 
attitudes and feelings are probed, challenged and 
queried (by the teacher, doctor, manipulator) until 
they are either confirmed, reformulated or rejected.
Called "maieutics" by Platonic philosophers, the 
method supposedly draws out of a person only things
that are already within him; this would mean that any 
conclusions he comes to are ultimately under his own 
responsibility •••• In its purest forms, insight
therapy is more a guided dialogue of the patient with 
himself than a substantive discussion with another 
person .• 25 
Psychoanalytic theory, therefore, offered rich in­
sights, and a kind of treatment technique which met the 
needs of a profession seeking methods oriented to individ­
24J .. C. Coleman, Abnormal Ps cholo y and Modern Life, 
2nd ed1tion (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 195 , p. 225. 
25per~ London, Behavior Control (New York: Harper
and Row, 1969), pp. 58-59. 
15 
ualized service. 26 The selection of Freudian theory was not 
without difficulties. Psychoanalysts, for example, had to 
undergo extensive training in order to acquire their skill, 
whereas social workers applying the same insights often 
launched into such difficult areas of interpretation without 
-the necessary knowle~ge of underlying thoughts and feelings. 
However, as a direct result of the impact of Freudian psy­
choanalysis in the 1920's and 1930's diagnostic social work 
theory was formulated and taught by the~aculty of such 
leading schools as the New York School of Social Work, the 
University of Chicago School of Social Service Administra­
tion, and Smith College School of Social Work. 27 
Social casework has incorporated and taught from 
many assumptions derived from Freudian theory. Caseworkers 
usually work fr.om the assumption that maladaptive behavior 
is a surface symptom of an underlying emotional dis­
order. 28 Also the importance of family relationship in 
26Germain, 2£. cit., p. ~Q. 
27Ruth E. Smalley, liThe Functional Approach to Case­
work Practice," in Theories of Social Casework, ed. by 
Robert W. Roberts, Robert H. Nee {Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 83. 
28Max Bruck, "Behavior Modification Theory and Prac­
tice: A Critical Review," Social Work, Vol. 13, No.2 
(April 1968), p. 39; Florence Hollis, If ••• And What Shall 
We Teach? The Social Work Educator and Knowledge," Social 
Service Review 42 (June 1968) pp. 184-96. 
h 
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the development of the individual, especially during the 
earliest years, has been accepted by social work practi­
tioners:29 
All social workers must recognize that the family 
as a unit of interacting personalities is the primary
institution in the formation of personality and charac­
ter.30 
Social work's individualizing emphasis in casework was 
derived as much from psychoanalytic thought as from demo­
cratic-Judeo-Christian ideas. 31 Freid1ander states that: 
Caseworkers must be able to use skillfully the 
knowledge of human behavior In stressful situations. 
Such knowledge is to be found in psychological theories 
on the structure, development and functioning of the 
ego and its manifest expressions in the persona1ity.32 
Or to quote other socla1 work literature: 
Along with this recognition of the complexity of 
human motivation there is an understanding of the 
purposive and symptomatic nature of overt behavior. 
29Virginia Robinson, A Changing Psychology in Social 
Case Work (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1930), p. 34. 
30He1en I. Clarke, Princi les and Practice of 
Work (New York: D. Appleton Century Company, Inc., 
p:tf20. 
31 8Germaln, ~. c1t., p. 1 • 
32Walter A. Friedlander, Concepts and Methods of 
Social Work (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Rall, 
Inc. ), p. 21. 
17 
In other words overt behavior is the result of certain 
uneeds" which motIvate it; the behavior is the "symptom ll 
of these tfcauses."33 
Numerous other examples could easily be drawn from the lit­
erature, but sufrice it to say that Freudian-theory has had, 
and continues to have, a profound impact upon tbe social 
work profession. 
What is Generic Social Work? 
The position taken in this paper agrees with Alfred 
Kahn's statement that, liThe unifying conceptual key to all 
social work method has not yet been identified •••"34 To 
cite an instance, because psychoanalytic concepts have been 
so extensively incorporated into social work a great deal of 
the professional literature has concerned itself with dif­
ferentiating the function of the psychiatrist and the social 
worker. Lucille Austin states that cases suitable for case­
work are those in which the client is able to focus upon 
social adjustment and relationships; client's needing to 
deal with psychological content would be treated via psy­
chotherapy.35 Judd Marmor disagrees with Miss Austin. He 
33Bisno, 2E. cit., p. 21. 
34Alfred J. Kahn, ed., liThe Function of Social Work 
1n the Modern World," Issues in American Social Work (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 7. 
35Lucille N. Austin, "Relationships BetweE;n Family 
Agencies and Mental Health Clinics," Social Casework (1955)
36:51-59. 
18 

states that her distinctions are not valid and that rrboth 
approaches must· consider intrapsychic as well as social 
factors. '.' 36 
The current trend within social work, ~nd the one 
upon which behavior therapy has capitalized, is more con­
sIstent with Miss Austin1s position than it is with 
l 
Mar­
mor's. Social work, in an attempt to establish a unique 
identity, has turned to a more pronounced focus in the tra­
ditional role of the social worker as the expert in all 
social aspects. 37 Justin Simon adheres to this emphasis in 
his pronouncement that the essence of social work is in the 
word "social" and its complex ramifications. 38 
Social Work Values: What Are They? 
Numerous authors have dealt with the subject of 
social work values. 39 However, the basic issue of the under­
36Judd Marmor, "Indications for psychiatric therapy 
or social casework," Social Casework (1955) 36:60-63. 
37Alfred Kadushin, "The Knowledge Base of Social ~ 
Work," in Alfred Kahn, ed., Issues in American Social Work 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 63-64. 
38Justin Simon, "Toward a Psychoanalytic Definition 
of Social Casework," Social Service Review (1962) 36:1-12. 
39Smalley, ~. cit., p. 121; Friedlander, £E. cit., 
pp. 2-6; Florence Hollis, Casework, A Psychosocial Therapy 
(New York: Random House, 1965), p. 12; Bisno, 2£. cit., 
pp. 10-11; Swithun Bowers, OMI, "The Nature and Definition 
of Social Casework," Journal of Social Casework (1940). 
n .. 
19 
lying importance of professional values has been given scant 
attention. 40 According to casework-critic Elizabeth 
Salomon (1967), the casework process has two fundamental 
parts, the personal intuitive and empathic and the scien­
tific. She says that although it is difficult in our cu1­
ture, the caseworker must have an increased consciousness 
that the two parts intersect in the professional relation­
ship. Miss Salomon described the two philosophical positions 
as that of positivism (the philosophical system dealing only 
with positive facts and phenomena, rejecting abstract specu­ l ) 
lation) and humanism (any system of thought or action prin­ I
I 
cipally or exclusively concerned with human interests and 
val;ues). 
Some workers within the profession feel that if there 
1s a conflict between the scientific, or positivistic, 
values and humanitarian values, that the humanitarian values I 
~ 
Jwould be the ones to be discarded. 41 If, in fact, this is 
how the conflict is resolved, social work may shift from its 
40This' paper is following K1uckhohn 1 s definition of 
value, 1951, p. 395, as rra conception, explicit or impliCit,
distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group,
of the deSirable, which influences the selection from avail­
able modes, means and ends of action." 
41Barbara Varley, "Social Work Values: Changes in 
Value Commitments of Students from Admission to M.S.W. Gradu­
atl.on," Journal of Education for Social Work, Vol. 4, No.2 
(Fall 1968), pp. 67-76. 
20 
I primary humanitarian values of the dignity and the right of 
each individual to full development of his capac1ties, the 
interdependence of individuals and their consequent respons­
ibility toward each other in the framework of their capaci­
ties. For according to the positivistic point of view: 
With its credo of a new enlightenment, its cult of 
objectivity and its empirical methodo10gy--the currency
of the world of Freud and Richmond--the world is dis­
coverable and knowable. Its scientific method, induc­
tion, consists of breaking down natural objects into 
their characteristic elements and then elaborating
these elements into types--or concepts, Judgments, con­
clusions and theories. Most Significant, the inductive 
method of positivism holds that a real world can be 
observed and that the observer can be divorced from what 4he' observes. 2 f 
There is considerable agreement that the general 
values held by the social work profession are unclear, if 
indeed they are existent. Ernest F. Witte stated that: 
The corroding influence of the materialistic society
in which social work is practiced appears:to change the 
behavior and values of social workers and make their 
response more nearly like that of the general public
despite professed goals which would suggest a different 
pattern. zt3 
42Elizabeth L.· Salomon, "Humanistic Values and Social 
Casework," Social Casework, Vol. XLVIII No. 1 (January 1967) 
p. 27. i 
43Ernest F. Witte, fIStudent Wisdom and Values: The 
Positive Force of Disaffection," Social Work Values in an Age 
of Discontent, ed. b¥ Katherine A. Kendall, New York Council 
on Social Work (1970), p. 95. 
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Ruby B. Parnell concurs with Mr. Witte: 
American social work, both as an expression and 
instrument of American social and moral values, is 
inextricably tied up with what America is at anyone
period of time and this tends to reflect the major con­
cerns of the era. We have moved as toe times demanded 
or permitted from a commitment to charity, to a commit­
ment to justice, to a commitment to science • • • • Com­
passion, social justice and disciplined knowledge are 
all part 0440ur armamentarium, though we fall short in 
all three. 
The main implication of this confusion regarding profeSSional 
values is that individual ·workers do not determi~e their 
diverse value selections by standards of their profeSSion, 
but by such things as their cultural and family background, 
the precepts and demands of a given group, their own per­
sonal· experience, and/or in terms of some soc1al~:scientific 
theory regarding human behavior. 
The positivist might well argue that the issue of 
values is of little import: after all the therapist can be 
objective. However, numerous studies have demonstrated that 
the observer cannot be divorced from what he observes. Be­
haviorists might argue for their "objectivity" on the ground 
that they are able to make decisions, to diagnose and formu­
late treatment plans, without ever being subjectively 
44Ruby B. Pernell, "Social Work Values on the New 
yFrontiers," Social Work Values in an Age or Discontent, 
edt by Katherine A. Kendall, New York, Council on Social 
Work Ed. (1970), p. 51. 
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involved. It must be pointed out that their "objective 
theory," their principles and concepts, have been va11dated 
only because they have been seen as ngood,1f via subjective 
Judgments of a 'number of peers. Further~ treatment is 
always directed toward a goal which has been Judged as 
"good" by someone. Usually the therapist is the one who 
determines the goal as being one of "better social adapta­
tion" or the like. Does not the Judgment of what behavior 
is "adaptlve tl necessarily imply a value judgment? Adaptive 
in terms of middle class ethiCS, democracy, in terms of the 
continuation of the social "status quo," individual happi­
ness, mankind, survival, development of the species, art and 
creativity, encouragement of genius or of mediocrity and 
conformity? 
The therapist does not work independently of an 
assumed value pOSition. Casework is a social ,situation in 
which therapist and client respond in a system of mutual 
influence. Goldstein (1962) has brought together considerable 
literature on this area. He demonstrated that expectations 
have an im~ortant effect upon how other's behavior will be 
evaluated, and upon which behavior will be manifest. For 
example, there is an interdependence of the client's expec­
tations of help and the likelihood of his being helped. 
Also, the therapist may be influenced by how well he likes 
the subject. Self-fulfilling prophecy is frequently at work: 
23 

The therapist who evaluates the subject as a poor
risk for therapy will be less likely to establish good 
rapport, which will increase the chances of failure, 
and validate his original belief that the person was a 
poor bet. Knowledge about social class, and intellec­
tual and verbal abilities may all make the patient more 
desirable for therapy and lead him to be assigned to a 
more capable therapist. 5 \ 
Regardle'ss of how the therapist r s values are acq.uired, 
the worker does train the patient to emit certain selected 
IIcorrect" responses. Marmor has described the results of 
this process: 
But what is insight? To a Freudian it means one, 
thing, to a Jungian another, and to a Rankian, a Horney­
ite, and Adlerian, or a Sullivanian, still: another. 
Each school gives its own particular brand; of ins1ght.
Who shall say whose are the correct insigh~s? The fact 
is that patients treated by analysts of all these schools 
may not only respond favorably, but also believe strongly
1n the insights that they have been given. Even admit­
tedly "inexact ll interpretatiops have been noted to be of 
therapeutic value. Moreover, the problem is even more 
complicated than this for, depending upon the point of 
view of the analyst, the patients of each school seem 
to bring up precisely the kind of phenomenological data 
which confirm the theo~ies and interpretations of their 46 
analyst. Thus, each theory tends to be self-validating. 
Values are, therefore, basic to pract,ice. Social work 
must be more than an art based upon intuition. It mus.t be 
45Leonard P. Ullman and Leonard Krasner, Case Studies 
1n Behavior Modification (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win­
ston, 1965), p. 37. 
46JUddMarmor, "Psychoanalytic Therapy as an Educa­
tional Process" (Paper presented at Academy of Psychoanaly­
SiS, Chicago, May, 1961, in J. H. Masserman, ed. Psycho- ' 
analytic Education (New York: Grune and Stratton, .1962) • 
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Ibased upon values and principles and an organized, eclectic I 
I 
body of knowledge. Because social work values have not been 
f1rmly established, social work's claim to professional status 
is Buspect. Etzioni points out 1n his book The Semi­
Professions that because social work failed to distin~uish 
itself as a profession, it has become a mere society of 
technicians. Etzioni states that social work practice is 
not determined, as is the medical practice, by professional 
standards or values, or by the patient1s problem, but by 
the policy of the agency in which the social worker 1s 
employed. Social workers are best described as agents of I 
their particular system. Unfortunately, the question of the 
social worker's identity can best be addressed if we first 
know something of the individual worker's personal back­
ground and values, his social scientific preference and the 
agency in which he works. 
Should Social Work Borrow Knowledge From the Social Sciences? 
There is hardly one national or state conference that 

does not today have an appreciable segment of its program 

devoted to consideration of the relationship of social 

science theory and research to social work practice. 

Ihstitutes and workshops with social science themes and 

social science partiCipants are proliferating, schools 

of social work are increasingly more cognizant of this 

content in master's as well as doctoral programs, and 

our journals reflect similar growing awareness. It is 

pertinent to note also that trends within the field of 

psychiatry have had some effect on social work in this 

regard, as 1n so many others. It might be fair to say 

that an even more intensive interaction with the social 
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sciences has developed within psychiatry than within 
social work., There is no escaping the conclusion that 
the social sciences. are with us, and we cannot look to 
psychiatry as a haven against these new winds that are 
blowing our way. They are blowing just as strongly 
within psychiatry. One may note, as illustrations, 
several recent works that reflect the growing collabora­
tion between psychiatrists and social scientists • • • • 
The relevance of social science to social work may no 
longer be questioned. What. is important is how we pre­
pare ourselves to be selective and judicious about what 
we choose to accept, how we choose to integrate and 
apPl y what we accept, and what we ourselves decide to4test. 7 
Albeit it is acknowledged that social work is still a 
long. way from having "a scientifically tested and validated 
practice theory," social work is attempting to improve its 
scientific approach with the use of the physical and the 
48social sciences. -- However, as the previous section pointed 
out, social work I s historical emphasis upon goals', which are 
derived from certain fundamental values, presents difficul­
ties for the researcher. When the worker applies scientific 
knowledge he is necessarily involved not only in "what is" 
but also in what "should be. 1I EVen social scientists are' 
47Herman D. Stein, "The Concept of the Social Environ­
ment in Social Work Practice," 1n Ego-Oriented Casework: 
Problems and Perspectives, ed. by Howard J. Parad and Roger
R. Mlller, Family Service Association of America, New York (1963), pp. 65-66. 
48s . Z. Hasan, "Concepts and Methods in Soclal Work 
Research," in Cora KasiuB, ed. New Direction in Social -Work 
(New York: Harper, 1954). 
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becoming cognizant of the fact that "neither the body of 
knowledge, nor the activities of its seekers, is morally 
neutral.,,4g In addition social workers must seek to uti11ze 
scientific knowledge to pursue humanitarian goals. 
However, social scientific knowledge has been help­
ful to the social worker, and can continue to be. Applied 
soc1al science may help social work, for example, to create 
both descr1ptive and prescriptive diagnostic principles and 
~ typology of understand1ng of what types of problems can 
be handled at various levels of practice. Social science also 
could aid in developing a closer approximation of a concept 
of non-pathological processes and a fuller appreciation of 
man's potential1ties. 50 
Inherent in these contributions are dangers. Because 
of the time lag in the interdisciplinary movement, soclal 
workers are likely to borrow yesterday's knowledge. Also 
workers are likely "to endow borrowed knowledge with a 
greater degree of certainty than,is granted it by the disci­
49Cohen, OPe cit., p. 291. 
50James L. Breedlove, "Some Implications of Social 
Science for Social Work" (unpublished paper, Apri11960). 
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p11ne which originally developed this knowledge. u51 Mr. 
Kadush1n c1tes as exemplary the fact that although there are 
251 definitions of the word "culture tf ln the literature, 
soclal work continues to use the word as though there were 
only one possible meaning. Next, social workers "are 11kely 
to borrow a simplified version of the truth, and one falsi­
fied to the degree that, it is s1mp11fied. u52 In his article 
"Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action," 
Max Millikan addressed himself to the fallacy of sc1entists 
who maintain that they can predict complex social behavior. 
This is fallacious because science is by definition atom­
istic--it must separate and isolate parts of the whole'in 
'\ 
'j 
order to analyze and study the phenomenon in question. Once 
something is isolated from the whole, from its social con­
text, it most often becomes a completely different phenome­
non. If, for example, it was initially a social phenomenon 
it no longer has anything with which to interact, and thus 
can be examined only as a static. rather than a dynamic. 
Millikan expresses that "after the material has been separ­
ated from its context it is then reduced to its lowest 
51Alfred Kadushin, "The Knowledge Base of Soc1al 
Work" in Issues in American Soc1al Work, Alfred Kahn, ed. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p,_ 67_ 
52Ibid, p_ 68. 
'. 
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terms.,,53 The danger of "simplification" follows for gen­
eralizations which stem from social science theory and 
research; it must be remembered that they remain general­
izations. 54 There is the added danger of "confusion of 
identifications which seems to be the result of interprofes­
alonal 	borrowing."55 
Helen Harris Perlman56 state~ that part of the problem 
1n the 	use of social science theory is not in the theory but 
in social work itself: 
Our difficulty is our overwhelming sense of needful­
ness--the feeling that somehow we have failed to find 
the keys that unlock the right doors to human behavior. 
This combines with the hope that someone else hol~these 
keys. Once we thought sociology held them; then we 
thought psychoanalytic theory held them; now we seem to 
think social science holds them. We are not even sure 
.what social science consists of, what combined bodies of 
knowledge are its constituents and whether all of these: 
bodies can claim the rubric "science." But we reach out 
avidly, eager to know better in order to do better. 
The caveat we must hold before ourselves is against 
letting the need blind us~ Words seem to hold magic,
and the use of words like Hcommunication" and "trans­
action" and "client system" and "role network" may 
infuse us with a heady sense of having something to con­
cur with. We can weave word-spells around one .another, 
but unless we plumb these words for their particular
meaning, for what phenomena. they express, and then for 
what their implications for action ar~, we will find 
53Max F. Millikan, "Inquiry and Policy: The Relation 
of Knowledge to Action," in The HUman Meaning of the Social 
Sciences, ed. by Daniel Lerner (1959), pp. 158-182. 
54Stein, "Concept of Social EnVironment," p. 67. 
55Kadushin, OPe cit., p. 68. 
56Helen Harris Perlman, "Social Work' Method: A 
Review of the Past Decade," in The Practice of Social Work, ed. 
by Robert W. Klenk and Robert M. Ryan (Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc.), pp. 57-75. 
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ourselves disappointed again that what we thought was 
gold is dross. Something of this sort has begun to hap­
pen in work on family diagnosis. It somehow doe~7not 
quite tell us what to do about family treatment.~ 
The final danger is that borrowed material will re­
main in an "undigested lump: interesting but unintegrated 
and unused."58 There has been no systematic attempt on the 
part of the social work profession to validate social scien­
tific knowledge. "A seemingly truthful, self-evident hypo­
thesis achieves the status of fact by sheer repetition 
,,59
. . For example, there is a general acceptance in 
the literature of the hypothesis that the client demon­
strates high negative ambival'ence when applying for finan­
cial assistance. Howe~er, research gives -a much firmer 
reason to believe that this hypothesis is true for some 
client groups but not for others. 60 
Kadushin describes that although social work has 
some systematized high-level abstractions regarding the 
worker's approach to the client, concepts such as accep­
tance, non-judgemental attitude, and self-determination, and 
57 Ibid., p. 7. 
58, 6Kadushin, 2£. cit., p. 9. 
59Ibid ., p. 48. 
60Ivor Svarc, "Client Attitudes Toward Financial 
Assistance--A Cultural Variant," Social Service Review XXX 
(1956)pp. 136-'146, in Kadushin, .QE.. cit. 
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some broad treatment typologies, such as social therapy, sup­
portive treatment and insight therapy, there is an essen­
tial difference between the high-level abstraction of self­
determination, for example, and the actual face-to-face 
I 
I 	 application of this concept in treatment. Kadushin con­
trasts the difference "between knowledge based on exper­
ience and casual observation as against knowledge formulated 
on the basis of rigorous, critical, systematic examination."61 
Essentially, "thete is a gap in the- identification and sys­
tematic validation of our knOwledge.,,62 
It must be kept foremost in the worker's m1nd that 
the primary value of social science content is its relevance 
to practice.63 And if social work is to b.orrow, then the 
"test of relevance should be applied within the function and 
competence of the social 'work practitioner.64 Applied 
.knowledge must be put to a pragmatic test. Is the theory 
useful to social work? Does it offer a better explanation 
for the material in question? Does it suggest new and bet­
ter solutions for problems? These questions do not inquire 
61Kadush1n, OPe cit., p. 50. 
62Ibid ., p. 51. 

63Stein, "Concept of Social Environment," p. 66. 

64Ibid ., p. 67. 
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of the theory's validity, but they do test the applicability 
of the theory to the field of social work. 65 In order to 
borrow effectively from the social sCiences, social work 
needs first to examine the client's needs, and then to 
undertake applied research designed to convert social scien­
tific theory into principles of practice. One of the first 
tasks to be accomplished in such research is an analysi-s of 
the value implications: to clarify social work goals in 
relation to cultural and/or social scientific values. 
Behavior Therapy as Reactive to Traditional, Psychodynamic 
Therapy 
Essentially behavior modification wa~ a therapeutic 
approach developed in reaction to the so-called dynamic 
school. Earlier in the paper a case was made for the 
strong heritage which social work has acquired from this 
ffdynamic" school. Therefore, it would at first glance 
appear that the "behavior modification" or "learning theory" 
approach might be in contradiction with some of the under­
lying assumption of social work. In order to assess the 
therapeutic relevance, however, it is nece~sary to examine 
first what principles of dynamic psychology the behavior­
65Selma Fraiberg" "Psychoanalysis and the Education 
of Caseworkers," in Ego-Oriented Casework: Problems and 
Perspectives, ed. by Howard J. Parad and Roger R. Miller 
(New York: Family Service Association of America, 1963), 
pp. 236-258. 
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ists were reacting to; second, the assumptions upon which 
they based their reaction; third, how, in fact, they did 
react: what was the nature of the "contradictory" practice 
theory? 
Behaviorists take issue with five basic tenets of 
psychodynamic theory. Like the medical disease model, the 
psychodynamic model incorporated the assumption that mal­
adaptive behavior was simply a surface symptom of an under­
lying emotional disorder, and that any direct attempt to 
modify such behavior must fail or result in substitution 
66of other symptoms. Coleman is very explicit in his 
adherence to the traditional or dynamic viewpoint: 
Psychological treatment ••• focuses on (1) helping
the patient to understand the dynamic significance of 
his symptoms--how they came about and why he uses them, 
and (2) helping him to strengthen his personality and 
find more adequate and effective means of dea~ing with 
his problems • • • • 
The first major obstacle is the resistance of the 
patient to being cured. What the neurotic really wants 
is to be cured of his symptoms without having to face 
his problems or to give up the more or less unconscious 
satisfactions which the symptoms obtain for him. Thus 
he frequently insists on discussing his symptoms at 
great length, seemingly in a sincere attempt to help the 
therapist get a clear v1ew of them • • • • 
66BruCk, .QE.. cit., p. 39; Florence Hollis, " •••And 
What Shall We Teach? The Social Work Educator and Knowledge, " 
Social Service Review 42 (June 1968), pp. 195. 
/ 
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In some cases the patient1s symptoms may temporarily 
disappear so that he is convinced it is unnecessary to 
return for further treatment. For th1s reason the im­
mediate disappearance of symptoms is often looked upon 
as a poor prognostic sign. In still other cases the 
symptoms may seemingly become intensified and the 
patient may report that he is becoming worse and has de­
cided to consult another therapIst. ThUS, it is often 
very difficult to overcome the patient1s resistance to 
the actual facing of his problems; yet this is required
in any effective therapy. 
A common pitfall in therapy is the treatment of 
symptoms rather than underlying personality difficul­
ties ••• unless the underlying personality conflicts 
are properly handled by psychotherapy the same neurotic 
symptoms or others designed t0 defend the patient from6his problems will soon appear. 7 
Behaviorists state that Coleman's notion of not 
treating the symptom directly ignores the patient's reason 
for coming to therapy. EysenckJ a behaviorist, reports 
that, "there is no neurosis underlying the symptom but 
merely the symptom itself. Get rid of the symptom and you 
have eliminated the neurosis.,,68 Ullmann and Krasner argue 
that, 
It seems fairer to use one's scientific and pro­
fessional knowledge to help the patient achieve "his n 
goal than it is to draw him into a process, even if it 
is called self-actualization which the pat6ent did not request and which is not firmly validated. ~ 
67Coleman, ~. Cit., p. 225. 
68Ho J. Eysenck, "Learning Theory and Behavior 
Therapy," Journal of Mental Science (1959), in Leonard P. 
Ullman and Leonard Krasner, Case Studies, pp. 61-75. 
69ullman and Krasner, Case Studies, pp. 40-41 • 
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Behavior modifiers continue to point out that literature 
dealing with the question of whether or not insight 1s a 
Bufficient condition for change in actions is replete with 
negative instances. 70 
Second, the behavior therapists point to the weak­
ness in psychodynamic theory of development: it is essen­
tially a conflict theory which assumes that all develop­
ment, normal and neurotic, stems from the conflicting 
demands of id, ego, and superego. While neurotic structures 
may be formed through these conflicts, normal structures are 
not and their development must be explained 1n any adequate 
theory of development. Contrariwise, the behavior modifi­
cation people utilize a variety of learning principles like 
reward and punishment to account for all behavior. For the 
behaviorist all behavior, no~al and pathological, is learned 
behavior, and is therefore dependent for its existence upon 
past and present reinforcement principles. As B. F. Skinner 
maintained--what is learned is what gets reinforced by the 
individual's reinforcing·communlty. The basic construct 
for behavioral psychology is expressed by the equation 
B = f{s) which means that behavior is some function of the 
70D. D. Cahoon, If Symptom Substitution and Behavior 
Therapies: A Reappraisal," Psychological Bulletin 69 (March
1968), pp. 149-56. 
I 
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stimulus. Stimulus comes, in this case, from the external 
environment; for even if there were recognizaQ1e stimul1 
from inside the 1ndividual they would be discounted by the 
behaviorist, because they would not be available for assess­
ment by the objective observer. All behavior is defined as 
either respondent, that behavior which is controlled by the 
preceding stimulation, or operant, those responses con­
trolled by consequent stimulation. 
, ' In addition to not being effective 1n the area of 
symptom alleviation, the behaviorists argue that the psycho­
dynamic therapies are extremely restrictive in their defini­
tion of the client population. Traditionally, attention was 
directed to the individual, his motivation and his verbal 
skill so that the institutional or soc1al inadequacies were 
obscured. Further, this approach was often less effective 
with cl1ents having problems that were socially perceived 
71
rather than self-perceived. Problemmatic were the facts 
that those whose personal or cultural characteristics did' 
not coincide with the model tended to be excluded, and that 
the exclusive focus upon the individual process all but 
ignored the social context in which the person and the 
72problem were embedded. Behaviorists, in opposition, 
7lGermain, op. cit., p. 21. 
72Ibid, p. 15. 
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dlrect all of their attention to the environment: to that 
which is external to the organism. Further, they do not 
eliminate clients on the basis of their verbal accessibility, 
or their capacity for introspection. Rather, they group 
clients into problem areas, some of which they claim greater 
success than others, attempt to systematically discover the 
way in which the "symptomatic" behavior is being reinforced,' 
and treat by altering the system of reinforcement. They 
maintain that all behavior is learned in this way, and 
therefore no client is necessarily excluded from therapy. 
Following the medical, or disease modal, the psycho­
dynamic theories were based upon the idea that the client 
was in some way deficient. Further, the model led to the 
categorization of clients in terms of presumed underlying 
111nesses. The behaviorists argue that the psychodynamic 
nosology were developed on a descriptive basis and as a 
result of socla1 and historical pressures, and that there­
fore they were only products of medical sociology rather 
than groups based upon the validation of clearly defined 
dlseases or definlte patterns of behavior.73 Behaviorists 
agaln maintain that they avoid such "socia1 and historical" 
pressures: they do not have an elaborate nosology; rather 
73ullman and Krasner, ~. cit., p. 9 
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they look carefully at the symptomatic behavior, what pre­
cedes and follows the behavior, and upon the basis of such 
information establish treatment.74 According to Hilgard: 
The working behavior therapist is likely to ask 
three questions: (a) what behavior is maladaptive,
that is, what subject behaviors should be increased or 
decreased; (b) what environmental contingencies ~­
rently support the subject's behavior either to maintain 
his undesirable behavior or to reduce the likelihood of 
his performing a more adaptive response; and (c) what 
environmental changes, usually reinforcing stimuli, may
be manipulated to alter the subject1s behavior. 75 
Finally is the issue alluded to above: psychodynamic 
terms are badly defined; in fact, operational definitions 
are almost entirely lacking. The dynamiC focus upon 
thoughts and feelings makes dynamic ~heory relatively inac­
cessible to research methodology. The verbatim records, 
case studies, of psychotherapy are naturalistic records. 
Such records are important for one phase of the de­
velopment of science and have the invaluable function of 
bringing the scientific observer a reasonably complete view 
of the real-life situation that he is encountering. How­
ever, naturalistic records are hard to analyze and, because 
of the inability to carry out experimental controls, they 
74William R. Morrow and Harvey L. Gochros, "Miscon­
ceptions Regarding Behavior Modification," Social. Service 
Review Vol. 44 No.3 (September 1970), p. 293. 
75E• R. Hilgard, Introduction to Psychology 3rd ed. 
(New York: Harcourt, 1962), p. 614. 
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are difficult to use as a basis for the actual confirmation 
or disconfirmation or a theory. Also language of the 
dynamic clinicians has been demonstrated to have very low 
reliability, and to bear little relationship to the ensuing 
treatment.76 In contrast, behaviorists claim to use no 
terms, diagnostic categories nor treatment processes which 
cannot be defined operationally: in phenomenological terms. 
Behaviorism, in many ways, was more of a philo­
hsophical position than a scientific method. 77 Essentially 
the behaviorists combined logical positivism'in philosophy 
and operationism in physics to human behavior. Concepts, 
such as mental constructs and processes, which could not be 
subjected to empirical study were rejected. B. F. Skinner 
explained that: 
••• "mind" and "ideas" are non-existent entities, 
invented for the sole purpose of providing spurious
explanations • • • • Since mental or psychic events 
are asserted to lack the dimensions of physical 
sCien~8' we have an additional reason for rejecting
them.1 
76Herman' O. Schmidt and Charles P. Fonda, ItThe Reli­
ability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: A New Look," in Herbert 
C. Quay, ed. Research 1n Psychopathology (Princeton, New 
Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963; Frederick H. Kanfer and 
George Saslow, "Behavioral Diagnosis," in Cyril Franks, ed. 
Assessment and Status of Behavior Thera les and Associated 
Developments New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1970 • 
77Char1es A. Catania, Contemporary Research in 
Operant Behavior (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and 
Company, 1968), p. 1. 
78B• F. Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour (New 

York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 30-31. 
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Behavior of the individual was to be manipulated and mea­

sured in· a controlled laboratory situation. Explanation of 
behavior was couched 1n positivistic assumptions such as the 
atomistic nature of the whole and linear causality. In ex­
planation, the behaviorists proposed to understand all of 
human behavior by first understanding simple behaviors and 
then combining a number of simple behaviors. Further the 
behaviorists operational assumptions that behavior occurs 
lawfully, so that any human problem could be viewed as part 
of a chain of cause-and-effect relationships, led to the 
consequent idea that the amelioration of problems can and 
should be planned. Being operationally defined and based 
upon such empirical behavior principles as the law of 
operant reinforcement and the law of extinction, behavtorists 
claimed to have an empirically validated practice theory.79. 
In summation, behavior modification is a practice 

theory based upon social scientific learning theories. 

H. J. Eysenck, for example, defined behavior therapy as "the 
attempt to alter human behavior and emotion in a beneficial 
79H• J. Eysenck, Ex eriments in Behaviour Therapy 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 19 ,pp. 0-51; Gordon 
Paul, Insi ht vs. Desensitization: An Experiment in 
Anxiety Reduction Stanford: Stanford University Press 
.1966); Gordon Paul, tlInslght VB. Desensitization in Psycho­
therapy Two Years After Termination," Journal of Consulting 
Psychology 31 (August 1967), pp. 33-48. . 
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manner according to the laws of modern learning theory.nBa 
The behaviorists assume that all behavior is learned, and 
is therefore under the control of stimuli from the exterior 
environment. In terms of learning theory, there is no such 
thing as pathological behavior that is separate from normal 
behavior: normal and abnormal behavior are considered con­
tlnuous. Influenced by the cultural relativism of anthro­
pology, the behavior therapist assumes the position th~t 
behavior is "abnormal" only if it is inappropriate for the 
environment in which it occurs. If it suits the cultural 
or subcultural norm, it is adaptive; if not, it is mal­
adaptive. The cause of abnormal behavior is the particular 
history of reinforcement of each individual. 
Of import is the fact that there is not one modern 
learning theory. 
The point is that psychologists engaged in behavior 
modification make use of a variety of learn1ng theories, 
but their actual operations can be describedayith ease 
by anyone of a number of learning theories. 
80H• J. Eysenck, "The Nature of Behaviour Therapy," 
in Experiments 1n Behaviour Therapy (New York: The Macmil­
lan Company, 1964), p. 1. 
8lUllmann and Krasner, Case Studies, p. 16. 
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For example, behaviorists working with children or hospital­
ized clients usually apply terms derived from B. F. Skinner's 
work, while workers dealing with adult sexual or neurotic 
problems more often utilize terms and concepts derived from­
the work of Guthrie. 82 
These theories were formulated as a result of experi­
mental data collected on cats, pigeons, rats, and monkeys. 
Following Darwin's notion that there is biological contin­
uity among organisms of similar structure, the principles 
developed from laboratory experiments with animals were 
83
applied to humans. Because these applications met with 
some success, it was subsequently assumed that human beha­
vior followed basically the same laws as did animal 
behavior. 
Behavior therapy practice follows from the philo­
sophical assumptions of logical positivism. In all methods, 
the client's responses are carefully observed before therapy 
begins, and the therapeutic plan is then designed specifi­
cally to meet the client's specific need. Very briefly 
there are four basic types of behavior therapy now prac­
82Bruck, g£. cit., p. 48; L. Breger and J. L. McGaugh, 
"Critique and Reformulation of 'Learning Theory' Approaches 
to Psychotherapy and Neurosis," Psychological Bulletin (1965)
63:340-343. 
83Catania, 2£. cit., p. 2. 
-1m; 
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ticed. The first, and by far the most prevalent within 
social work, is called operant conditioning. Based upon the 
postulate that all behavior is controlled by its conse­
quences, it exists not only as an independent method, but 
also presupposes all other kinds of behavior modification. 
Looking at operant conditioning in terms of a formula: 
S ~ R ~ R+ is the designation meaning that a stimulus elicits 
a response which must be positively reinforced in order for 
a response to continue or increase in frequency. The thera­
peutic technique, thus, is one of manipulating the rewarding 
or punishing content of environmental stimuli, and is util­
ized with children having severe behavioral problems, 
autistic children, self-help skills and increased contact 
with environment in psychotics and retardates; conversion 
reactions, enuresis and speech disorders. 
Second, a subtype of "operant conditioning," is 
"aversive therapy" or "counter-conditioning. 1f In counter­
conditioning an aversive stimulus is presented simultan­
eously with a maladaptive response in order to extinguish, 
or weaken it, or an aversive stimulus is removed in order 
to negatively reinforce a desirable response which has a 
low frequency. In Borne situations, extinction is accom­
panied by the withdrawal of a positive stimulus after a 
maladaptive response. This method has been used in treat~ 
lng alcoholism and sexual disorders o 
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The method of "negative practice" has also been util­
ized in extinguishing maladaptive responses by repeatedly 
eliciting them in the presence of neutral or reinforcing 
circumstances. For example, it has been assumed by beha­
viorists that UneuroticU behavior was learned because of 
anxiety-producing conditions in the environment. Thus, if 
the response is frequently emitted when these conditions 
are removed, the nneurotic " response should disappear. 
Behavior modification literature describes this technique 
as applicable to problem areas such as stuttering, tics, 
sexual disorders, and obsessive compulsive reactions. 
Finally, there' is the method of "systematic desensi­
tization. 1f Based upon Hull's principle of reciprocal inhi­
bition and upon Skinner's development of behavioral shaping 
by successive approximations, this process begins with the 
construction of a hierarchy of anxiety-producing stimuli. 
The patient is placed, next, in a state of extreme relaxa­
tion, and stimuli of gradually increased anxiety content 
are then introduced. Fundamental to desensitization is the 
postulate that no human being 1s capable of entertaining two 
antagonistic feelings simultaneously; that is, one cannot 
feel anxious and relaxed at the same time. In theory, the 
relaxed state of the organism is incompatible with an 
anxiety state, consequently the inappropriate maladaptive 
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responses are ext1ngu1shed.84 Desens1tization 1s the treat­
ment choice for pho~ias of all types. It has also been used 
with conversion reactions, anxiety reactions, impotence and 
frig1dity, voyeurism, exhibitionism and stuttering. 
Critique of Behavior Modification 
Negative reactions to behaviorists have been diverse 
and numerous. This paper, however, will only sketch out 
three broad categories of criticism. First is the area of 
behaviorism1s assumed value position. The purely socio­
logical "environmentalism" of learning theory has raised a 
number of questions as to the nature of man, and the extent 
to which he can or cannot be determined entirely by his 
milieu. Von Bertalanffy argued that, 
If you manipulate a dog according to Pavlov, a cat 
accord1ng to Thorndike, or a rat according to Skinner, 
you will obtain the results described by these 
authors. That is, you select, out of their behavioral 
repertoire, such responses as may be controlled by 
punishment or reward, you "make" the animals into 
stimulus-response machines or robots. The same, of 
course, is true of humans • • • • However, in so doing, 
you de-rattisize rats and dehumanize humans •••• 
Psychology in the past fifty years was a fight
against what has been called the "anthropomorphic
fallacy,fI that is, imputing to animals human sentiments 
84Joseph Wolpe and Arnold A. Lazarus, Behavior TheraPl 
Techniques (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966). 
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and capabilities. But it was for~otten that there 

equally is a "zoomorphic fallac8~ canceling any dif­

ference between animal and man. ~ 

Erich Fromm expresses his discontent in another direction: 
Therapy aimed at nothing but social adjustment can 

only reduce the excessive suffering of the neurotic to 

that average level of suffer1n§ inherent in conformity 

to these patterns • '. • • The adjusted" person in the 

sense in which I have used the term here is one who has 

made himself into a commodity, with nothing stable or 

definite except his need to please and his readiness to 

change roles. As long as he succeeds in his efforts 

he enjoys a certain amount of security, but his betrayal

of the higher self, of human values, leaves an inner 

emptiness and insecurity which will become mane6est when 

anything goes wrong in his battle for success. 

In a" sense the behaviorist assumes the position of a I 
technician. The client's presenting problem 1s "fixedu by 1 
the therapist; however, the client is in no way helped to be 1 
more capable of dealing with the next problem which arises. I 
Essentially the painful symptom may be alleviated, but the 
client is not helped toward growth; toward understanding, 
for example, how he developed the symptom initially. There 
are no value positions, says the behaviorist; all values are 
relative to the culture. Of course if values are relative 
to the culture, then they must be relative to the sub­
culture within that culture, next they must be relative to 
85LUdWig Von Berta1anffy, Robots, Men and Minds (New 
York: George Brazi11er, 1967), pp. 13-15. 
86Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1950). 
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the groups and sub-groups with1n the sub-culture, and 
finally they must be relative to the individual. For the 
behaviorist, theoretically then, there could be no shared 
values. Von Bertalanffy exchanges the word "meaning" for 
rrvalues": 
Of course, in II verbal behavior" (Skinner, 1957)
within a linguistically full-grown society the conven­
tionalpattern of operant behavior and reinforcement 
plays a large role. Nevertheless, as Chomsky (1959) has 
emphasized in his critique of Skinner's book, learning 
by "meaning" or "understanding" is essentially different 
from and cannot be reduced to reinforcement. In Skin­
ner's scheme, there is no place for a sentence1s being 
n true" (i. e., corresponding in some way t.o ff fact"); one 
sentence is as good as the other, presupposing it is 
sufficiently reinforced. This, also, is correct for 
manipulating psychology, the condition1ng of the human 
animal through mores, ingra1ned metaphys1cs and pre­judices, mass med1a and the 11ke. It leaves completely 
unexplained that there is something like a search for 
"object1ve truth" (independent of and frequently contra­
dicting reinforcement and animal gratification), that 
there is "mean1ng" beyond conditioned response to word 
stimuli, that the latter form grammats7al patterns accord­ing to laws of symbolic systems • • • 
Academic psychologists have difficulty dealing with a 
number of things which would seem to be rathe·r essential to 
deal with.: 1n a theory regarding human behavior. They cannot, 
for example, speak of eth1cal reality; they have no way to 
account for efforts at self-comprehension; there is no way, 
80 to speak, for behaviorists to hold their man together: 
87Bertalanffy, £E. clt., pp. 26-27. 
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for example, where does the individual store his "history of 
reinforcement"j how and when does it become pertinent to the 
present? They cannot account for the wholeness of a person 
apart from the part processj neither can they deal with 
growth and change within a ,context of an enduring identity; 
finally, there is no explanation for the concreteness of an 
individual's own special experience. There is little ques­
~ion that behavior modification techniques have proven suc­
cessful in the alleviation of many symptoms, and in Von 
Bertalanffy's terms that human can be made into robots, but 
do we have to follow the direction of an eminent American 
scientist who stated that, "We ~ go to the moon, for the 
simple reason that we can do it,,?88 
If social workers were to subscribe to behavior 
therapy as a practice theory there would be value implica­
tions. First, if it were assumed that man was solely a pro­
duct of his environment, then the diagnostic process could 
have only one direction: to und~rstand a particular indivi- ' 
, dual, the worker 'need only understand the environmental forces 
upon him. Second, principles such as "self-determination" 
would have to be discarded for not only does the therapist 
assume complete charge of the process, but egalitarian'ism 
88Rene Dubos, "Second Edition: Does Man Have a 

Future," The Center Magazine Vol. IV No.2 (March/April

1971 ), p. 57. 
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reigns: individual differences are simply a result of the 
environment. Finally, social work therapy would consIst 
entirely of social action: if the worker would improve the 
man, he must first improve his milieu. 
A second group of criticisms centers around the be­
haviorist claim of being "scientific." Behavior modifiers 
claim to have "operationalized tl their terms, but what, for 
example, is the operational definition for "reinforcement"? 
Is reinforcement a concept or a taut~ogy? It is appro­
priate here to recall Perlman's warning that words seem to I 
hold magic; workers cannot allow themselves to be blinded I 
by words. Is the behaviorist operational definition of 1, 
human behavior satisfactory for social workers? Finally, 1 
I 
I 
are the behaviorists capable of being as "objective ft as they 
maintain? Can they remain truly separate from their sub­ I 
;jects? Daniel Yankelovich and William Barrett answer these J 
1questions in the negative: 
There is no reality to be measured independently

of the measuring apparatus. If, now, one thinks of the 

measuring apparatus as a means of perception, then we 

may say that the lesson of modern physics is the subject

(perceiving apparatus) aAd object (the rea11ty measured)

form one seamless whole.~9 

89Daniel Yankelovich and William Barret, Ego and 
Instinct: The Ps choanal tic View of Human Nature Revised 
New York: Random House, 1970 , p. 203. 
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Carl Rogers questions that anyone can "objectively" know 
anything: 
Thus, if a physicist says that he uknows" that the 
speed of a freely falling object is expressed by the 
formula, v = 32t, what he means is that various indi­
v1duals, whom he trusts have each gone through similar 
operations, which can be precisely described, and have 
observed similar results; and each has arrived at a 
similar subjective conviction, which is expressed in 
the formula, which is understood in a similar manner by
all. The physicist believes the convictions are similar 
because he has exercised his own empathic ability in 
understanding the communications and the internal frame 
of reference of others.90 
Finally, the question must be asked, does behavior 
modification offer better explanations for the material in 
question, or are the answers merely more simplistic and 
therefore more easl1y digested? A number of practice 
theories have unfortunately followed Wittgenstein's loglc when 
he stated, rrWoven ~ nicht sprechen leann, claruber muss man 
nicht schweigen" (Whereof one cannot speak,thereof one must 
be silent). How are practitioners to gr,?w if the unanswered 
questions are not clearly stated, and someone does not 
attempt their resolution? Finally, regarding behavior 
therapy, social workers might do well to remember Cohen'S 
warning: 
gOT. W. Wann, ed., Behaviorism and Phenomenology 

(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1964), p. 113. ­
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Social work, with the help of the social scientiats, 
must continue to seek ways of enriching its own knowl­
edge and skills from this so~rce. In so doing, however, 
it must avoid the danger of mere substitution of soci­
ology for psychology.91 , 
Nature/Nurture: An ~Old'Debate? 
Ostensibly, behaviorism amounted only to a denial 
of the doctrine of innate ideas: that man has an "essence" 
of "inner nature n which remains unaffected by the vicissi­
tudes of sensory experience. In actuality, however, be­
haviorism's argument with the "traditional" approach was an 
offshoot of a much deeper issue--nthe perennial question of 
nature versus nurture. u92 Another way which this debate can 
be described is through the paradoxes of practice outlined 
by Halmos in his book, The Faith of the Counsellors. 93 
Basically Halmos explicated upon six paradoxes which 
he felt were inherent in the therapeutic process: At the 
same time that the therapist was to utilize scrupulously 
thought out strategies, he was to act and react with spon­
taneous lovingness. The client was dealt with as though 
motivated by supreme rationa11ty and intelligence and/or 
91 . 
Cohen, ~. cit., p. 332. 
92Richard Lowry, The EVolution of Psychological 
Theory (New York: Aldine-Atterton, Inc., 1971), pp. 54-55. 
93p • Halmos, The Faith of the Counsellors (New York: 
Schocken, 1966). 
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he was impulsively or emotionally motivated. Therapists 
were told to "be-in-charge" at tl'?-e same time that they were 
being non-directive. The therapeutic act was viewed simul­
taneously as an act of caring or helping and an application 
of science. Therapists were forced to deal with the paradox 
of whether their client learned'by didactic teaching or 
insight. Finally, the worker was taught that the process 
had a beginning, middle and end concurrently with the idea 
that there was an interminable nature to the therapeutic 
relationship. 
Behaviorists, in their reaction to psychoanalytic 
thought, basically pOinted out that the dynamic model had 
addressed itself primarily to only one side of each of 
Halmos' paradoxes. In effect the behaviorists have only 
assumed the other side of each pair. Behaviorism concen­
trates upon what the client doesj behavior modification is 
completely planned around the establishment of an S-R 
bond;94 the therapist is ''In charge" of the process;95 
emotionality is an unwanted and unneces~ary intervening 
variable; the process has a beginning, middle and end; and 
the process is entirely empirical; it is a direct applica­
94U11mann and Krasner, Case Studies, p. 36. 
95Morrow and Gochros, ~. cit., p. 302; Wolpe and 
Lazarus, £2- cit., p. 17. 
52 
tion of science.96 The very fact that these theor1es hav~ 
limited themselves iri this manner ha~ made each of them In­
adequate practice theories. 
Each tries to be simultaneously comprehensive and rigor­
ous, treating everything and explaining everything.
Neither aim is achieved very well because the extremes 
of each position reflect an oversimplified view of human 
behavior; translated into the clinical area, this over­
sImplifIcation r.equires .psychotherapists to be contin­
uously ready to cheat on their systems or on their 
intellects if they want to work ve~ well and explain 
to themselves what they are doing.~·( 
96ullmann and Krasner, Case Studies, p. 37. 
97perry London, Behavior Control (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1969), p. 56. 
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